be corporeal, because there is no walking without feet* nor seeing without eyes. But at the same time he declares, that the mind or intellect does pre-exist and come in from without, that is, is incorporeal, separable, and immortal, giving his reason for it in like manner :[a] AaWeu §£ *rov vow* ^oimu

OvpaQtv CTTcicrtcvat, *teat Bttov swat [tovov** ouSf *ya/> ctvrov rjy sEvcp-ya^t *KOWWVU* <ra>ftarua/ €plp*y[aa]" *t remains, that

the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only Divine; since its -energy is not blended with that of the body's, but it acts independently upon it.—Notwithstanding which, Aristotle elsewhere[1]* distinguishing concerning this mind or intellect, and making it to be twofold, agent and patient, concludes the former -of them only to be immortal, but the latter corruptible ; *rovro JULQVQV a&dvarov teal* cuSiov, o Se *TraQijTiKQS* wuc $0aproc> the agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible:—where tiome interpreters, that would willingly excuse Aristotle, contend, that by the passive intellect is not meant the patient, but the fantasy only, because Aristotle should otherwise contradict himself, who had before affirmed the intellect to be separable, unmixed, and inorganical, whilh they conceive must needs be understood of the patient. But this salvo can hardly take place here, where the passive intellect is directly opposed to the agent. Now what Aristotle's agent understanding is, and whether it be anything in us, any faculty of our human soul or no, seems to be a thing very questionable, and has therefore caused much dispute amongst his interpreters; it being resolved by many of them to be the Divine intellect, and

* ibid* * Bt AninrA> lib. iiL cap, rt. p. 50, torn. iL oj»cr.